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 This dissertation explores the determinants of the inclusion of total-asset net-
worth covenants in debt contracts. Frankel, Seethamraju, and Zach  
(2008) find that the magnitude of intangible assets is positively associated with the 
inclusion of total-asset net-worth covenants. This finding raises the question of why such 
an association exists, given that intangible assets can be worthless at liquidation and 
generate cash flows with high uncertainty. To answer this question, I examine if the 
decision to include intangible assets in debt covenants is a function of three factors: 
borrowing firms’ reliance on future cash flows related to intangible assets to make loan 
payments, lenders’ industry expertise, and access to private information. I find that debt 
contracts are more likely to include total-asset net-worth covenants when borrowers have 
higher debt-to-tangible assets ratio. I also find that debt contracts are more likely to 
include total-asset net-worth covenants when lenders have expertise in the borrowing 
firm’s industry or have a longer lending relationship with the borrowing firm. These 
findings help us to understand why intangible assets are employed in some debt 
covenants, and they shed new light on the information needs for intangible assets in debt 
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Intangible assets account for a significant portion of U.S. corporate assets. 
Between 2005 and 2011, about half of U.S. public firms reported goodwill on their 
balance sheets, and among those reporting goodwill, goodwill averaged 14-15% of total 
assets. Despite the economic importance of intangible assets, prior research argues 
against a role for these assets in debt contracting because they can be worthless at 
liquidation, present a high degree of uncertainty in underlying cash flows, and are 
measured for accounting purposes using highly subjective rules (e.g., Holthausen & 
Watts, 2001; Watts, 2006). 
Nevertheless, some studies present evidence of the use of intangible assets in debt 
contracts. Frankel, Seethamraju and Zach (2008) find that debt contracts are more likely 
to use a Total-Asset Net-Worth covenant (i.e., intangible assets are included in the net-
worth calculation), when intangible assets comprise a larger percentage of total assets.1 
This association is consistent with the magnitude of intangible assets being an important 
factor in the use of these assets in debt covenants, but does not address the question of 
                                                 
1 A Tangible Net-Worth covenant excludes intangible assets in its net-worth calculation while a Total-




why this is the case.2 To shed light on this question, I investigate several additional 
possible determinants of the inclusion of intangible assets in net-worth covenants. 
Specifically, I explore the following three possible determinants of the inclusion 
of a Total-Asset Net-Worth covenant (hereafter, TOTNW): the reliance on intangible 
assets to make debt payments, lenders’ industry expertise, and lenders’ access to private 
information related to intangible assets. As explained in greater detail later in my thesis, I 
employ the debt-to-tangible assets ratio to proxy for the borrowing firms’ reliance on 
intangible assets to make debt payments, the number of participant lenders who have 
previous lending experience in the borrower’s industry to proxy for lender’s industry 
expertise, and the average length of time that the lead lender(s) has been the lead arranger 
for the borrowing firm to proxy for the lender’s access to private information. 
Aghion and Bolton’s (1992) model suggests that debt covenants protect lenders 
by granting them the right to alter their relationship with borrowers in certain states of the 
world.3 This implies that debt covenants are more effective when the accounting numbers 
are employed in covenants that correlate with the states of the world.4 This is especially 
                                                 
2Frankel et al. (2008) do not provide a directional prediction about the association between the magnitude 
3 In Aghion and Bolton (1992), the signal is exogenously given and is imperfectly correlated with the state. 
The true state is perfectly observable to both contracting parties although the state is not contractible. Both 
the state and the signal arise before the manager takes his action.  
4 I follow Banker and Datar (1989) and characterize the correlation between the states of world and 
accounting numbers in terms of sensitivity and precision of accounting numbers. In Banker and Datar 
(1989), sensitivity is defined as the sensitivity of signals to managers’ actions and precision is defined as 




crucial in down states of the world, since lenders face asymmetric payoff structures, and 
are ultimately concerned whether they will get fully repaid.  
Research that argues against a role for intangible assets in debt contracts rests on 
the argument that intangible assets are irrelevant to lenders’ welfare due to the fact that 
intangible assets are expected to lose value upon liquidation and are reported based on 
subjective rules. This suggests that intangible assets are insensitive and noisy signals 
about states of the world.5 Nevertheless, recent research provides evidence suggesting 
that intangible assets play a role in debt contracts in some circumstances (e.g., Frankel et 
al., 2008; Loumioti, 2012). To shed light on the issue, I explore situations in which 
intangible assets could be relevant to lenders’ welfare and the close and effective 
monitoring of managers’ reporting is possible. I find that under these circumstances, 
intangible assets are included in covenants, which is consistent with the idea that when 
intangible assets are a more sensitive and precise signal, they are more likely to be 
employed in debt covenants.  
I argue that intangible assets are relevant to lenders’ welfare when future cash 
flows generated by intangible assets are a potential source of debt payments. I use the 
debt-to-tangible assets ratio to capture the extent to which debt payments might rely on 
cash flows produced by intangible assets. Consistent with my prediction, I find that 
                                                 
5 Theoretical research usually assumes signals are exogenously given and no conflicts about which signal is 
written into covenants. In the case of intangible assets, the contracting parties might have disagreements 
over whether intangible assets will be sensitive and precise about the state of the world. Prior research 
generally agrees that intangible assets present economic benefits to equity-holders, but suggests that these 
assets are worthless to lenders, although recent evidence suggests that this might not be the case in some 




firms’ debt-to-tangible assets ratio is significantly and positively associated with the 
inclusion of TOTNW in levels analysis. This result is robust to controlling for the 
positive association documented in prior research between intangible assets as a 
percentage of total assets and the use of TOTNW covenants. Thus, my finding suggest 
that it is not the size of the intangible assets vis-à-vis total assets that is important for the 
decision to employ a TOTNW, but the extent to which the future cash flows generated by 
intangible assets might be relied upon debt payments. Furthermore, this result 
demonstrates that intangibles could be relevant to lenders’ interests, which disputes the 
prior belief that the liquidation value of intangibles is the only concern for lenders. 
An important characteristic of intangible assets is that evaluating these assets 
relies heavily on internal information, such as the projection of firms’ performance. 
Goodwill, the most significant intangible asset on corporate balance sheets, is a good 
example. SFAS 142 requires the recorded value of goodwill to be assessed for 
impairment in a manner that relies heavily on managerial judgment and projections.6 In 
contrast, external information, such as observable market values, is more likely to be 
available when tangible assets are valued. Thus, the information sources and subjective 
reporting rules for intangible assets suggest that lenders’ ability to effectively monitor the 
value of intangible assets could be an important factor in determining whether intangible 
assets are included in covenants. 
                                                 
6 SFAS 142 requires valuation technique (e.g., discounted cash flow model) to estimate the fair value of a 
reporting unit when quoted market prices are not available, which serves as the first-step of impairment 
test. The Accounting Standards Update No. 2011-08 eliminates this quantitative test and only requires 





I argue that lenders are more likely to have greater monitoring ability if they have 
industry expertise or access to private information. Industry expertise gives lenders an 
understanding of the industry’s economic conditions, which is a key input into the 
evaluation of intangible asset values. Further, an existing relationship with borrowers 
might provide lenders with greater access to private information such as managers’ inputs 
into the discounted cash flow models employed to evaluate goodwill, and a more 
complete understanding of the company and its economic situation. 
To capture lenders’ industry expertise, I use the number of participant lenders 
who have experience lending to the borrowing firm’s industry over the 5 years preceding 
the loan issue date. I measure lenders’ access to private information by the average length 
of time that the lead lender(s) has been the lead arranger for the borrowing firm. This 
measure captures two key characteristics to proxy for factors that enhance lenders’ 
information access – a previous transaction and longevity of the relationship (Berger & 
Udell, 1995; S. Bharath et al., 2007).  
As predicted, I find that lenders’ industry expertise is positively associated with 
the inclusion of TOTNW. This result holds after controlling for the proportion of assets 
that are intangible assets. This finding contributes to our understanding of the role that 
lenders play in the use of intangibles in debt contracts. The association between access to 
private information (RelaLend) and the inclusion of TOTNW is statistically insignificant. 
This result suggests that access to private information (as proxid for by RelaLend) is not a 




Alternatively, this nonresult might be due to inadequate controls for differences between 
the comparison groups. I address this latter issue via the changes analysis I describe next. 
I conduct a changes analysis to address the above concern and provide additional 
support for my levels analysis. The change analysis mitigates the concern that time-
invariant unobservable factors drive the associations I document here. It also mitigates 
the concern that inadequate control for differences between the comparison groups 
included in my analysis leads to a lack of testing power in the levels analysis. The 
changes analysis employs a subsample of the firms that move from using a Tangible Net-
Worth covenant (hereafter TANNW) to TOTNW, and vice versa. I find that increases in 
the debt-to-tangible assets ratio are positively associated with changes from TANNW to 
TOTNW, even after controlling for the changes in the proportion of assets that are 
intangible. This confirms the results of my levels analysis. In addition, I find that an 
increase in the number of participant lenders with lending experience in the borrowing 
firm’s industry over the 5 years preceding the loan issuance date and a lengthening of the 
average time that the lead lender(s) has been the lead arranger for the borrowing firm is 
associated with the movement from TANNW to TOTNW. Thus, the results from the 
changes analysis support all three predictions, confirm and strengthen the results of my 
levels analysis, and provide evidence of a causal relationship between these factors and 
the use of TOTNW.  
I focus on the net-worth covenant because it is frequently used in debt covenants 




intangible assets.7 Thus, this covenant is particularly relevant to the understanding of the 
role of intangible assets in debt contracting. 
My study contributes to the emerging literature on the role of intangibles in debt 
contracts (Frankel et al., 2008; Loumioti, 2012) by exploring the effect of borrower and 
lender characteristics. My results suggest that intangible assets are not shunned by 
contracting parties, but are included in debt contracts when intangible assets are 
economically relevant to their interests. This finding provides evidence that contracting 
parties consider more than the event of liquidation when evaluating the relevance of 
intangible assets to their interests. Second, my findings contribute to the literature that 
examines the implications of lender characteristics for debt contracting (S. Bharath et al., 
2007; e.g., Ivashina & Sun, 2011) and for the use of intangible assets in debt contracts 
(Loumioti, 2012). Finally, my findings suggest that lenders can have an information 
advantage (i.e., industry expertise and access to private information) to effectively 
monitor and evaluate reported intangible assets. This is in contrast to prior research that 
argued that lenders would not care about intangible assets.  
The remainder of my dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a 
review of the literature on intangible assets and debt covenants; Chapter 3 develops the 
                                                 
7 More specifically, I focus on the inclusion/exclusion of intangible assets in net-worth covenants. 
Slackness of net-worth covenants is not emphasized in this paper because covenant slackness does not 
address the different potential roles of intangible assets. As Guay (2008) notes “threshold that provides no 
slack, the initial net worth threshold can be set at tangible net worth in the presence of an intangible asset 
exclusion provision (or at reported net worth in the absence of an intangible asset exclusion provision). The 
key role of debt covenants, however, is to mitigate agency conflicts associated with future actions that can 
be taken by managers. Thus, even though the initial net-worth threshold can be set to any tightness desired, 





hypotheses; Chapter 4 presents the research design; Chapter 5 provides a presentation and 
discussion of the sample selection and descriptive statistics; Chapter 6 provides a 
presentation and discussion of results; Chapter 7 discusses future research opportunities; 






In this chapter, I first discuss the economic characteristics of intangible assets and 
related empirical research findings. I then review the accounting rules for intangible 
assets and research on the impact of these reporting rules. Finally, I review the literature 
on debt covenants and intangible assets.  
 
2.1 Intangible Assets and Goodwill 
Intangible assets are commonly defined as assets that lack physical substance but 
are likely to yield future benefits.8 International Accounting Standards No. 38 defines 
intangible assets as nonmonetary assets without physical substance held for use in the 
production or supply of goods or services, for rental to others, or for administrative 
purposes: (a) that are identifiable; (b) that are controlled by an enterprise as a result of 
past events; and (c) from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the 
enterprise. 9  
                                                 
8 According to the FASB’ SFAC 6, par. 25, assets are probable future economic benefits controlled by and 
accruing to a particular entity as a result of past transactions or events. 
9 There are resources, such as research and development expenditure, that are not recognized as intangible 
assets in financial statements because the associated future economic benefits are not reliably expected to 




Intangible assets account for a significant portion of U.S. corporate assets and 
goodwill is the primary type of intangible asset.10 Between 2005 and 2011, goodwill 
comprised 14-15% of total assets for approximately half of the U.S. public firms that 
reported goodwill on their balance sheets. Li and Sloan (2009) show that from 1997 to 
2007 goodwill as a percentage of total assets doubled - a significant increase in the 
amount of goodwill on U.S. corporate balance sheets.  
Intangible assets have three prime economic characteristics. First, intangible 
assets are risker than tangible assets because future cash flows generated by intangible 
assets are associated with a greater degree of uncertainty than those produced by tangible 
assets. For example, the economic definition of goodwill is the ability to earn abnormal 
returns on invested capital. A company’s ability to earn abnormal returns on invested 
capital is a function of its ability to maintain some competitive or other economic 
advantage, often for many years in the future. Accordingly, goodwill by definition is 
associated with cash flows with a very high degree of uncertainty. Second, some 
intangible assets (such as goodwill) are not separable from the firm, which makes 
piecemeal resale of these assets impossible. Third, intangible assets decline rapidly in 
value when a firm is in financial distress, and become worthless in the event of 
liquidation. Intangible assets are normally firm-specific and thus it is very difficult to 
identify a potential buyer for the asset. Given these economic characteristics, it is 
                                                 
10 Goodwill arises from a business acquisition. Under current accounting practice, goodwill is measured as 




questionable whether investors (debt or equity) find these assets relevant to their 
economic decisions. 
The value-relevance literature provides consistent evidence that equity-holders 
consider intangible assets to be economic resources. Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (2001) 
conclude that academic research studies generally finds that intangible assets, e.g., 
capitalized software and goodwill, are relevant to stock market investors and that the 
value of intangible assets is reflected in share prices.11 Therefore, equity-holders expect 
intangible assets to yield future economic benefits despite intangible assets’ unique 
economic characteristics. Although this research suggests that intangible assets are value-
relevant to equity investors, lenders are a different class of investors potentially with 
different perspective on the decision-usefulness of intangible assets. I discuss the 
literature pertaining to lenders in the last section of my literature review. 
 
2.2 Accounting for Intangible Assets  
Intangible assets are a controversial topic in the accounting community because of 
their unique economic characteristics (discussed in Chapter 2.1). Intangible assets are 
hard to value because they are associated with highly variant future cash flows, and are 
difficult to identify separately, which can necessitate the use of highly subjective 
discounted cash flow techniques in determining value. For example, goodwill impairment 
                                                 
11 The literature that shows the positive association between equity market value and goodwill and 
capitalized software includes the following studies (Aboody & Lev, 1998; Chambers, Jennings, & 
Thompson II, 1999; Chauvin & Hirschey, 1994; Jennings, Robinson, Thompson, & Duvall, 1993). See 





tests required by current accounting practice involve the application of discounted cash 
flow techniques, which entail forecasts of future cash flows and the determination of 
discount rates, all of which is subjective and uncertain.   
Not only are intangible assets difficult to objectively value, these assets might not 
have a defined period of time over which these assets are expected to generate cash 
flows. Take goodwill as an example; it is difficult to know ex ante how long a firm will 
maintain its ability to generate abnormal returns on invested capital. The evolution of 
accounting for intangible assets reflect standard-setters’ attempts to provide more 
decision-useful information regarding intangible assets given their challenging economic 
characteristics. 
In 1970, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 17 (hereafter, APB 17), 
Intangible Assets, deemed that all intangible assets be amortized on a straight-line basis 
over an assumed useful life not to exceed 40 years. APB 17 provides for the taking of 
impairment charges, but it is the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 121 
(hereafter, SFAS 121) that standard-setters provided explicit guidance regarding when to 
recognize and how to measure impairment losses. SFAS 121 specifies that intangible 
assets be tested for impairment when events or circumstances indicate potential 
impairments in the value of intangible assets, establishes a recoverability test to 
determine whether an impairment in value has occurred, and an approach to measure the 
impairment loss if impairment does occur.  
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (hereafter SFAS 142), 




indefinite lives.12 This standard eliminates amortization for these indefinite lived 
intangible assets and requires a test of impairment at least annually, which gives more 
prominence to impairments than prior standards. Under SFAS 142, managers must 
undertake a quantitative evaluation to screen for potential impairments by comparing the 
estimated fair value to the net book value of the reporting unit. Nevertheless, Accounting 
Standards Update No. 2011-08 removes the requirement to undertake a quantitative 
evaluation, and allows for a qualitative evaluation instead.  
As discussed above, which approach, amortization or impairment, provides better 
information continues to be debated in the literature. If the value of goodwill is a 
declining function over time, goodwill amortization could potentially be informative 
about changes in future cash flows or risks.  Several studies examine the information 
content of goodwill amortization. Jennings, Robinson, Thompson, and Duvall (1993) find 
only weak evidence of a relation between equity market value and goodwill amortization. 
This suggests that purchased goodwill might not be declining in value for some firms, 
and for those firms where it is declining in value, the actual rate of decline might differ 
substantially from the accounting amortization rate.  
Henning, Lewis, and Shaw (2000) decompose goodwill into several components 
and examine the relation between stock returns and the amortization of goodwill 
components. They find that stock returns are negatively associated with the amortization 
of the residual overpayment component of goodwill but find no relation between stock 
                                                 
12 The Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141 (hereafter SFAS 141) was issued 
simultaneously with SFAS 142 in 2001.  SFAS 141 eliminates pooling accounting, which means firms can 




returns and the amortization of the components of goodwill that has economic 
substances, such as the synergy value created by the acquisition. Moehrle, Renolds-
Moehrle, and Wallace (2001) provide evidence that the amortization component in 
earnings does not have explanatory power to stock returns, suggesting that goodwill 
amortization is not informative. On the other hand, Henning and Shaw (2000) examine 
goodwill amortization schedules and find evidence that the choice of goodwill 
amortization life is predictive of future earnings, expected growth, the amount of 
goodwill, and future stock performance, which suggests that this choice conveys useful 
information. Therefore, much, albeit not all, of the the literature on goodwill amortization 
suggests that goodwill amortization is not informative to equity-holders. 
A number of studies examine how equity-holders interpret goodwill impairments. 
In general, these studies find the stock market reacts negatively to goodwill impairments, 
and analysts revise their expectations downward on the announcement of an impairment 
(e.g., Bens, Heltzer, & Segal, 2007; Z. Li, Shroff, Venkataraman, & Zhang, 2011). At the 
same time, there is evidence that the market anticipates impairments (e.g., Chen, 
Kohlbeck, & Warfield, 2008; K. K. Li & Sloan, 2009; Z. Li et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, Riedl (2004) finds that after SFAS 121 the decision to write-off 
long-lived assets (including goodwill) has a higher association with “big bath” behavior, 
which suggests that managers act opportunistically rather than informationally with 
respect to write-offs. Ramanna and Watts (2011) investigate whether under SFAS 142 
managers will take advantage of the inherent flexibility in fair value estimates to realize 




information hypothesis). They find some evidence supporting the agency-based 
hypothesis. Hayn and Hughes (2006) find that managers’ decisions regarding goodwill 
impairments are a function of prior firm performance and the characteristics of 
acquisitions. This evidence raises the concern that managers use the discretion integral to 
impairments opportunistically to satisfy their incentives rather than convey private 
information. 
Overall, the evidence from empirical research suggests that goodwill amortization 
generally does not provide useful information, while impairments of goodwill can be 
informative but also can be used by managers to report opportunistically. 
 
2.3 Debt Covenants and Intangible Assets 
A lender’s ultimate concern is whether she will get repaid. To mitigate this 
concern, borrowers and lenders set up debt contracts to specify borrowers’ obligations, 
such as when to pay monthly principals and interests. Debt contracts also include a set of 
provisions called debt covenants that restrict borrowers’ actions. For example, cash 
dividend to the shareholders of borrowing firms might be prohibited until the debt is 
repaid. 
Debt covenants frequently incorporate accounting numbers (Smith Jr. & Warner, 
1979) and researchers have explored the role of accounting numbers in debt covenants. 
Aghion and Bolton (1992) 13 suggest that debt covenants protect lenders by granting them 
                                                 
13 In Aghion and Bolton (1992), the signal is exogenously given and is imperfectly correlated with the state. 
The true state is perfectly observable to both contracting parties although the state is not contractible. Both 




the right to alter their relationship with borrowers in certain states of the world. This 
implies that debt covenants are likely to be based on accounting numbers that correlate 
with the states of world.14 This is especially crucial in down states of the world, due to 
lenders’ asymmetric payoff structure. Empirical research provides evidence supporting 
the implication from Aghion and Bolton’s (1992) model. For example, Demerjian (2007) 
finds evidence that debt covenants are based on financial ratios that are informative of 
credit risk. 
Prior research questions the possibility that intangible assets present valuable 
resources to lenders because of the economic characteristics of these assets. Holthausen 
and Watts (2001) specifically argue that debt contracts frequently exclude goodwill 
because it becomes worthless at liquidation. Leftwich (1983) uses a sample of private 
debt agreements to provide evidence that goodwill and intangibles are frequently 
excluded from the measurement of total assets but amortization is included in the 
measurement of net income. This suggests that intangible assets play a minimal role in 
debt contracts due to the economic characteristics of these assets. 
Further, the accounting standards that guide the financial reporting and 
measurement of intangible assets might not yield asset values lenders view as reliable. 
Managers employ subjective estimates to a much greater extent in the evaluation of 
intangible assets than tangible assets. This gives rise to opportunities to manipulate the 
                                                 
14 I follow Banker and Datar and characterize the correlation between the states of world and accounting 
numbers in terms of sensitivity and precision of accounting numbers. In Banker and Datar (1989), 
sensitivity is defined as the sensitivity of signals to managers’ actions and precision is defined as the 




reported value of intangibles. Watts (2006)  argues that goodwill estimates are typically 
unverifiable since the periodic estimation requires a value for the firm (or part of the 
firm), which is frequently not verifiable. This opens door to fraud and manipulation.  
He suggests that for private contracting purpose, a conservative estimate is 
desired, which is why intangibles are excluded from the calculation of net assets as 
observed in Leftwich (1983). He also argues that managers take advantage of SFAS 142 
to avoid goodwill impairments and this makes earnings “softer” and noisier. Consistent 
with this, several studies show that managers use discretion opportunistically in taking 
goodwill impairments ( K. K. Li & Sloan, 2009; Ramanna & Watts, 2011).  
Nevertheless, several recent studies suggest that private lenders contract on 
intangible assets. Loumioti (2012) examines the use of other intangible assets (i.e., 
intangible assets other than goodwill) as collateral. She finds that asset liquidity and 
redeployability, as well as borrower reputation, affect the use of other intangible assets as 
collateral. This paper only focuses on other intangible assets and collateral while my 
thesis examines both goodwill and other intangible assets and thus my thesis helps us to 
understand goodwill, this predominant corporate intangible asset, in debt contracts.  
Furthermore, my thesis investigates the role of lender characteristics in the use of 
intangible assets in debt contracts. 
Frankel et al. (2008) and Beatty et al. (2008) investigate the use of intangible 
assets in net-worth covenants. They both document that TANNW is less likely to be used 
when intangible assets comprise a larger percentage of total assets. Beatty et al. (2008) 




the presumption that the exclusion of intangible assets results in more conservative net-
worth covenants. They do not find clear evidence supporting a positive association 
between TANNW use and accounting conservatism. Frankel et al. (2008) and Beatty et 
al. (2008) also find that firms with TOTNW have higher credit quality (in terms of credit 
ratings), and are larger than firms with TANNW.  
The positive association between the magnitude of intangible assets and the 
inclusion of intangible assets in net-worth covenants suggests that the amount of 
intangible assets is an important factor in the use of these assets in debt covenants. These 
studies discussed above do not explain why this association exists, however, especially 
given the economic and reporting characteristics of intangible assets.  In this thesis, I 
investigate the determinants of the role of intangible assets in net-worth covenants by 
examining how borrowers’ and lenders’ characteristics affect the decision to include 






A lender’s ultimate concern is whether she will get repaid, especially in a down 
state of the world. Debt covenants are designed to protect lenders by granting lenders the 
right to alter their relationship with borrowers in certain states of the world (Aghion & 
Bolton, 1992). The type of debt covenant included in a debt contract is a function of the 
relevance of that covenant item to the lender. For example, a lender’s interest in 
intangible assets might be greater if the lender expects debt payments might be supported 
by future cash flows generated by intangible assets. In this case, lenders are concerned 
with states of the world in which the value of intangible assets is reduced, and 
consequently, intangible assets are more likely to be incorporated in debt covenants. This 
prediction is consistent with Guay’s (2008) heretofore untested conjecture that one of the 
reasons intangible assets are included in net-worth covenants is that “creditors may have 
an interest in seeing the firm convert intangible assets to tangible assets over time.” Thus, 
my first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The probability of including TOTNW in a debt contract is 
positively associated with the reliance on intangible assets to fund debt payments. 
An important characteristic of intangible assets is that internal information such as 
firm-specific private information is crucial for evaluating these assets. Take goodwill as 




impaired, the amount of impairment be estimated in a manner that relies heavily on 
discounted future cash flow models employing managers’ projections.15 In contrast, in the 
event of impairment, the value of tangible assets often can be determined based on 
observable market values for the same or similar assets, such that it is generally easier for 
lenders to assess the value of tangible assets vis-à-vis intangible assets. Therefore, 
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers is generally greater for intangible 
assets than for tangible assets.  
Prior research argues that industry-specific information and access to private 
information are important for resolving information asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers (Boot & Thakor, 2000; Dell'Ariccia & Marquez, 2004; Hauswald & Marquez, 
2006). For example, prior research suggests that access to private information helps 
lenders design loan contracts tailored to borrowers’ characteristics (Berger & Udell, 
1995; S. T. Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, & Srinivasan, 2011). This suggests that lenders’ 
industry knowledge and access to private information are critical factors that could 
explain cross-sectional differences in lenders’ ability to understand and rely on the 
reported values of intangible assets, and consequently the use of intangible assets in net-
worth covenants.  
Lenders with industry expertise have superior knowledge of the economic 
environment within which the borrower operates. It follows that these lenders should 
more effectively evaluate managers’ assertions regarding the value of intangible assets. In 
                                                 
15 The Accounting Standards Update No. 2011-08 only requires qualitative evaluation when it is more 




addition, lenders with superior access to borrowers’ private information should have 
superior knowledge of the financial position and expected future performance of the firm. 
Therefore, I predict that lenders with industry expertise and/or access to private 
information are more likely to include intangible assets in net-worth covenants. This 
leads to my second and third hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2: The probability of including TOTNW in a debt contract is 
positively associated with Lenders’ industry expertise. 
Hypothesis 3: The probability of including TOTNW in a debt contract is 






4.1 Empirical Models 
I employ the following multinomial logistic model to test my hypotheses. I use a 
multinomial logistic model because it allows me to include not only loans with TOTNW 
and TANNW, but also loans that do not have net-worth covenants (hereafter, NNW).16 
This mitigates sample selection bias that might arise if the sample is limited to loans with 
either TOTNW or TANNW. 
 
Probability(NWSCOV=m) = γ0+ γ1DebtTan+ γ2IndLend+γ3RelaLend+γ4GW+ 
γ5OthIntan+γ6ZeroIntan+ γ7DebtTan*ZeroIntan+γ8RatingExist+ γ9RatingInv+ γ10ACQ+ 
γ11Size+ γ12BTM+ γ13LEV+ γ14ROA+ γ15LOSS+ γ16Maturity+ γ17SyndicateSize+ 
γ18LoanSize+ γ19Yield+ γ20FINcov+ γ21GENcov+ γ22Revolver           (1) 
 
 
My dependent variable (NWSCOV) is a variable indicating the type of net-worth 
covenant included in a debt contract. This variable equals three if a contract includes 
TOTNW, two if it includes TANNW, and one if it includes NNW. 
                                                 
16 I also estimate the logistic model of Frankel el al. (2008), including my variables of interest. In results 




My primary variables of interest are (1) DebtTan, (2) IndLend, and (3) 
RelaLend.17 DebtTan is the debt-to-tangible assets ratio, and is a measure to capture the 
reliance on intangible assets to make debt payments. A detailed discussion on this 
variable is in Chapter 4.2 of my thesis. IndLend, is one of two lender characteristics, and 
captures the extent to which the lenders have industry expertise. IndLend is the number of 
participant lenders who have experience lending to the borrowing firm’s industry over the 
5 years preceding the loan issue date. RelaLend is the second lender characteristic, and 
captures lenders’ access to private information.18 RelaLend is the average time that the 
lead lender(s) has been the lead arranger for the borrowing firm. The assumption 
underlying this variable is that lenders with a longer relationship with the firm have 
greater access to private information. The latter two variables are intended to capture 
lender characteristics that might mitigate the information asymmetry around intangible 
assets. Chapter 4.3 below provide a detailed discussion of my measurement procedures 
for these two proxies employed in my analysis. Appendix A summarizes variable 
descriptions.  
The signs of the coefficients on DebtTan, IndLend, and RelaLend (i.e., γ1, γ2, and 
γ3) test my three hypotheses. I predict all three coefficients (γ1, γ2, and γ3) to be positive 
based on my expectation that the reliance on intangible assets to make debt payments 
                                                 
17 Table 5.3 shows that IndLend and RelaLend are negatively correlated with Yield. This provides 
univariate support that these two contracts could mitigate information asymmetry between borrowers and 
lenders and thus facilitate a reduction in the premium.  
18 Following prior research (Berger & Udell, 1995; S. Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, & Srinivasan, 2007), 
RelaLend capture two key characteristics to proxy for lenders’ information access, previously transacted 




(DebtTan), lenders’ industry expertise (IndLend), and access to private information 
(RelaLend) are positively associated with the use of TOTNW.19  
I include the remaining variables include in the regression model to control for 
additional factors that could explain the type of net-worth covenant included in a debt 
contract. Frankel et al. (2008) find that the magnitude of goodwill (GW) and other 
intangible assets (OthIntan) are positively associated with the use of TOTNW. Thus, I 
expect γ4 and γ5 to be positive. I include an indicator variable (ZeroIntan) and an 
interaction term (DebtTan*ZeroIntan) to address a potential limitation of DebtTan for 
firms with zero intangible assets, which I discuss more fully in Chapter 4.2. Beatty et al. 
(2008) show that firms with TOTNW have higher credit ratings than those with 
TANNW. Following Frankel et al. (2008), I include variables for the existence of firm 
credit ratings (RatingExist) and a credit rating above investment grade (RatingInv) and 
expect the coefficients on these variables to be positive.20 In addition, prior research 
suggests that information asymmetry is mitigated for bigger firms. This implies that it 
might be easier for bigger firms to borrow based on their intangible assets. As a result, I 
expect to find a positive coefficient on firm size (Size). Finally, I follow Frankel et al. 
(2008) and control for the book-to-market ratio (BTM), leverage (LEV), the return on 
assets ratio (ROA), and the indication of negative net income (LOSS) because they show 
                                                 
19 Consistent with my prediction, Duke and Hunt (1990) show that firms with covenant restriction related to 
net assets have higher debt-to-tangible assets ratio than those without such restrictions. 
20 Since a large portion of the firms do not have a firm credit rating available (as shown in Table 2 Panel A, 
only about 46% has credit rating), Beatty et al. (2008) use a pooled cross-sectional regression to predict 
credit ratings for their sample firms. Instead of adopting the methodology of Beatty et al. (2008), I follow 
Frankel et al. (2008) to control for the differential credit quality across the covenant groups by controlling a 




that these firm characteristics might be associated with the choice of including net-worth 
covenants. 
Since the choice of net-worth covenants is simultaneously chosen with all other 
contract characteristics, I also control for several other contract characteristics. I include 
the maturity of the loan (Maturity), the syndicate size (SyndicateSize), the amount of the 
loan (LoanSize), the loan yield (Yield), and use of financial covenants (FINcov) and non-
financial covenants (GENcov). Based on prior research (Beatty et al., 2008; Frankel et al., 
2008), I expect the coefficients on Maturity, SyndicateSize, LoanSize, and Yield to be 
positive,21  but I do not provide formal interpretations for the coefficients on these 
variables due to the potential simultaneity between the choice of net-worth covenants and 
contract characteristics. Appendix A provides detailed variable definitions. 
 
4.2 Reliance on Intangible Assets to Make Debt Payments  
I use the debt-to-tangible assets ratio prior to the inception of the loan to capture 
the degree to which debt payments are expected to rely on the future cash flows 
generated by intangible assets. Although both intangible and tangible assets can produce 
cash flows to support the liabilities a firm assumes, prior research suggests that lenders 
prefer tangible assets because they can capture the value of tangible assets in default 
states (Almeida & Campello, 2007). This suggests that when tangible assets are not 
                                                 
21 Frankel et al. (2008) set TANNW covenant relative to TOTNW covenant as the dependent variable, 
while I set the dependent variable to be TOTNW relative to TANNW. Thus, the coefficients of Frankel et 




sufficient to fully support the debt, I expect lenders to place greater reliance on 
intangibles assets to support debt repayment. 22 
Consistent with this, the debt-to-tangible asset ratio is decreasing in the fraction of 
debt supported by tangible assets. An important characteristic of this ratio is that it 
acknowledges lenders’ preference for tangible assets over intangible assets, by first, 
taking into account the cash flow generating ability of tangible assets.23  For example, a 
debt-to-tangible ratio of two suggests that $2 of debt is supported by $1 of tangible assets. 
This implies that the other $1 is dependent on cash flows generated by intangible assets.24 
At the very least, the higher the value of this variable, the greater the likelihood that 
lenders might need to look to the cash flows generated by intangible assets for debt 
payment. Thus, cross-sectional variation in this ratio should capture cross-sectional 
variation in the reliance on intangible assets to meet debt payments.  
                                                 
22 One might ask if, similarly, it is expected that lenders are concerned about tangible assets when their 
welfare is tied to these assets. Although it seems the expectations are not different between intangible and 
tangible assets, there is an imbedded difference, in that lenders favor tangible assets over intangible assets 
for concerns such as liquidation. Therefore, the reliance on intangible assets to make debt-related payments 
is after considering the effect of tangible assets. 
23 Using debt-to-tangible asset ratio to capture the reliance on intangible assets to make debt payments has 
the following advantages over the debt-to-intangible (or intangible-to-debt) asset ratio: (1) the debt-to-
tangible asset ratio infers reliance on intangible assets based on the pressure on tangible assets to make 
debt-related payments: the more burden on tangible assets, the more likely that intangible assets contribute 
to the debt related payments. Thus, it gives priority to tangible assets in terms of repaying debt, which is 
consistent with lenders’ consideration; (2) it makes the research design easier to follow prior research 
because it is important to control for the magnitude of intangible assets as suggested by Frankel et al. 
(2008) and Beatty et al. (2008). If the debt-to-intangible asset (or intangible asset-to-debt) ratio were used, 
the interpretation of these ratios would be complicated by controlling for intangible assets. 
24 This assumes that tangible assets are not reported on the balance sheet at less than liquidation value. If 
tangible assets are reported on the balance sheet at less than fair value, this induces measurement error in 




A limitation of this measure surfaces in situations where a firm has zero 
intangible assets.25 In the example above, the implication that the other $1 is dependent 
on cash flows generated by reported intangible assets makes sense only if reported 
intangible assets are greater than zero. If not, the ratio does not provide the correct 
interpretation about the reliance of debt payment on reported intangible assets because 
firms with zero reported intangible assets cannot rely on such assets. Thus, to address this 
issue, I include an indicator variable (ZeroIntan) that equals one when a firm has no 
intangible assets and zero otherwise and a term that captures the interaction between 
DebtTan and ZeroIntan (i.e., DebtTan*ZeroIntan). 
 
4.3 Lenders’ Industry Expertise and Relationship Lending 
As previously discussed, there are two dimensions of lender characteristics, 
industry expertise and access to private information, which I predict to be associated with 
the use of TOTNW in debt covenants. There is, however, limited guidance from prior 
research regarding how to measure lenders’ industry expertise. Conceptually, lenders 
who have transacted with the borrower’s suppliers, customers, and/or competitors are 
likely to be more knowledgeable about the industry than lenders who have not. 
Empirically, this means that industry expertise could be derived from the knowledge 
                                                 
25 In my model, I include a dummy variable for zero intangible assets (ZeroIntan) instead of a dummy 
variable for zero Goodwill (GW_Zero) used by Frankel et al. (2008). ZeroIntan covers the case of zero 
goodwill and better suits my research questions underlying my model. In Frankel et al. (2008), GW_Zero is 
significant factor in determining the choice between TOTNW and TANNW (Frankel et al.-Table 5, page 
104). Consistent with this, my univariate analysis (Table 2, Panel B) shows that ZeroIntan is significantly 
higher for TANNW than TOTNW. Therefore, I need to include ZeroIntan as a control variable in my 




learned from the borrowers’ competitors, which helps lenders to better understand the 
business environment within which the borrower operates. Thus, industry expertise can 
help lenders to better evaluate the expected future cash flow and risk underlying 
intangible assets. 
To capture industry expertise empirically, I take the number of syndicated lenders 
with experience lending to the borrowers’ competitors (i.e., firms in the same Fama-
French 49 industry as the borrower) during the 5-year period preceding the loan issue 
date, and scaled it by the total number of syndicated lenders of the loan.26 I include only 
participant lenders in this measure, because prior research suggests that the “familiarity” 
between the borrowers and potential participants is likely to be an important 
consideration in the loan structure when the borrower is less transparent (Ivashina & Sun, 
2011; Sufi, 2007).  
Prior research suggests that “relationship lenders” who build a close relation with 
borrowers likely know more about the borrowing firm’s operations and have greater 
access to private information inside the firm than other lenders (S. Bharath et al., 2007; 
Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Sufi, 2007).27 Extant studies capture “relationship lenders” in a 
way that centers around the idea that relationship lenders have transacted previously with 
the firm ( S. T. Bharath et al., 2011; S. Bharath et al., 2007).  
                                                 
26 The classification of industry group does not affect my results. Similar qualitative results are obtained 
when industry is defined by 2-digit SIC. 
27 The special nature of lending relationships has been the subject of extensive theoretical and empirical 
research in finance. While there is no precise definition of “relationship banking,” the basic idea is that the 
financial intermediary develops a close relationship with borrowing firms through its interaction with the 




Moreover, prior research suggests that relationship length is an important aspect 
of a relationship ( Berger & Udell, 1995; Diamond, 1991; Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
Based on this idea, I measure relationship lending as the average number of years 
between the first time a lender is a lead arranger for a borrower and the current loan for 
each loan package. This measure captures the idea that the longer lenders have transacted 
with the firm, the more likely lenders have extensive knowledge of the firm’s operations 
and well-developed channels of communication with managers (S. Bharath et al., 2007; 
Sufi, 2007). 28 This information advantage is expected to help relationship lenders gain 
private information regarding managers’ projections pertaining to the performance of 
intangible assets. 
 
                                                 
28 Lead arrangers assume an important role in the syndicate process and the ex post contract monitoring 
because they design the syndicate for the borrower, offer the syndicate to the potential participant lenders, 
take a share of the syndicate, and monitor the borrower ex post the contract inception (Ivashina & Sun, 




SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
5.1 Sample Selection 
My sample is drawn from the Dealscan database from Loan Pricing Corporation 
and includes 66,454 loan facilities activated between 1992 and 2007 with nonmissing 
loan amounts, loan maturity, and loan yield information.29 I exclude facilities that cannot 
be matched with Compustat Annual data, which reduces my sample to 45,170 facilities.30 
To ensure that the financial data used in my analyses would be available to contracting 
parties at the time of contract formation, I use annual accounting data gathered prior to 
the activation date. Finally, I limit my sample to observations where all the necessary 
variables for all tests are available. This yields a final sample of 30,468 loan facilities for 
7,684 borrowers.31 Table 5.1 outlines my sample selection procedures.  
Within this sample, 3,828 facilities have TOTNW and 3,684 facilities have 
TANNW. This is consistent with prior research (e.g. Frankel et al., 2008), which finds 
that the number of loan facilities with TOTNW is approximately the same as those with 
TANNW. 
                                                 
29 My sample period ends in 2007, prior to the crunch hit at the end of that year. 
30 The sample loss is similar to that reported by Bradley and Roberts (2004). Dealscan includes debt 
contracts for private firms, which contributes to the sample loss when merging with Compustat. 





Table 5.1 Sample Selection 
Sample Period: 1992-2007a 
Numbers of facilities on Dealscan 66,454 
Number of facilities from Dealscan that can be matched with Compustat 45,170 
Number of facilities with sufficient information to construct variables used in 
tests 
30,468 
Number of borrowers 7,684 




5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.2 reports summary descriptive statistics for the sample. For ease of 
interpretation, I report the unlogged amounts in the summary statistics for the five logged 
variables (Size, Yield, Maturity, FINcov, and GENcov,). Panel A of Table 5.2 presents the 
descriptive statistics for my full sample, which includes observations with both types of 
net-worth covenants (i.e., TOTNW and TANNW) and those with no net-worth covenant 
(i.e., NNW).  
On average, my sample firms report goodwill (GW) comprising 9% of their total 
assets. About half of the firms have credit ratings (RatingExist and RatingInv). My 
sample firms varies a lot in market size (Size) and are highly leveraged (Lev). The lender 
and loan characteristics variables display a high level of variations as well (e.g., 
RelaLend, SyndicateSize, Yield, LoanSize, Maturity, FINCOV, and GENcov). Overall, Panel 
A of Table 5.2 shows that my sample varies widely in firm, lender, and loan 




Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
























































































































9 Lender Characteristics 






























00 Loan Characteristics 



































































Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics (continued) 
Panel B: Differences for sample with Total-asset NW (Tangible NW ) versus No Net-worth covenant 


















Firm Characteristics       
GW 0.12 0.04 0.09  >** >** <** 
OthIntan 0.018 0.01 0.025  >** <** <** 
ZeroIntan 0.76 0.86 0.71  <** >** >** 
RatingExist 0.369 0.223 0.51  >** <** <** 
RatingInv 0.366 0.221 0.50  >** <** <** 
Size 2,098.7 952.2 7315.5  >** <** <** 
BTM 0.66 1.02 0.92  <* < > 
LEV 1.60 2.62 3.24  < <* < 
ROA 0.03 0.00 0.02  >** >** <** 
LOSS 0.18 0.25 0.20  <** <* >** 
DebtTan 0.74 0.56 0.77  >** <** <** 
Lender Characteristics       
IndLend 0.41 0.29 0.34  >** >** <** 
RelaLend 1.11 0.98 1.20  >** <** <** 
SyndicateSize 16.55 7.72 16.31  >** > <** 
Loan Characteristics       
Yield 184.37 208.34 180.6  <** > >** 
LoanSize 0.28 0.27 0.29  > < < 
Maturity 43.80 36.15 46.01  >** <** <** 
FINcov 2.25 2.13 0.99  >** >** >** 
GENcov 3.42 2.13 1.74  >** >** >** 
Revolver 0.64 0.71 0.54  <** >** >** 
**,* denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05 or better for the t-statistics of mean differences. The underline 
“_”denotes significance at the 0.01or better for the Z-score of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.  For variable 






but I do not find significant trends in the use of TOTNW versus TANNW across my 
sample years (results not tabulated). 
Panel B of Table 5.2 presents mean differences for the sample, partitioned by 
whether the firm has TOTNW, TANNW, or NNW. The first three columns present mean 
values for the three groups. The last three columns (i.e., the fourth-sixth columns) 
provide the signs of the differences among the three groups. I also report the statistical 
significance of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test in addition to the t-statistics of mean 
differences. This is because compared to t-test, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is more 
robust against outliers and heavy tail distributions, which might be a valid concern for my 
sample (e.g., Size has a mean of 5,891.67 while median is only 627.85 as shown in Panel 
A of Table 5.2).  
My primary firm characteristic of interest is the debt-to-tangible assets ratio 
(DebtTan). Consistent with hypothesis 1, DebtTan is higher for firms with TOTNW than 
firms with TANNW. In addition, I find that firms with TOTNW have more GW and 
OthIntan, are more likely to have public debt (RatingExist) and investment-grade debt 
(RatingInv), and to be larger (Size) and more profitable (ROA and LOSS) than those with 
TANNW. These findings are not surprising because it would be easier for firms with 
better credit quality, larger size, and better financial performance to get their intangible 
assets to support lending, which is consistent with prior research (e.g., Frankel et al. 
2008). In general, the statistics for firm characteristics suggest that firms with TOTNW 
tend to have better credit quality, and are larger in size and financial performance than 




Another interesting observation from the firm characteristics is that BTM is the 
lower and below one for TOTNW group (with mean of 0.66). In contrast, BTM is highest 
and above one for TANNW group (with mean of 1.02). Prior literature uses the book-to-
market ratio (BTM) above one as the indicator of a firm with impaired goodwill (e.g., 
Ramanna and Watts, 2011) because the fair value of the firm as proxied by market value 
is less than the book value of the firm for BTM  greater than one, assuming the whole 
firm as the reporting unit for goodwill.32 Thus, the observation of the differences in BTM 
suggests that the TOTNW group (TANNW group) has intangible assets that are less 
(more) likely to be impaired. This is consistent with my prediction for Hypothesis 1, to 
the extent the reliance on intangible assets to make debt payments is more likely when 
such assets are less likely to be impaired. 
IndLend captures lenders’ industry expertise via the participant lenders who have 
lent to a firm in the current borrower’s industry in the preceding 5 years. RelaLend 
captures lenders’ access to private information as the average number of years of the lead 
lender(s) has been the lead arranger for the current borrower. Loans with TOTNW have a 
higher mean value of IndLend of 0.41 than those with TANNW, which have a mean 
value of IndLend of 0.29. Similarly, loans with TOTNW have a higher mean value of 
RelaLend vis-à-vis loans with TANNW (mean value of 1.11 versus 0.98). This provides 
preliminary support for my hypotheses 2 and 3 that lenders’ industry expertise and access 
to private information promote the use of TOTNW.  
                                                 
32 Another interpretation of the book-to-market ratio (BTM) is that the ratio represents growth opportunities 
(i.e., Low BTM is associated with higher growth). The finding that BTM is lower for TOTNW group is also 




Loan characteristics also differ between loans with TOTNW and TANNW as 
shown by the significant mean differences between the two groups. Loans with TOTNW 
have lower Yield, longer Maturity, more FINCOV and GENCOV, and less likely to be 
Revolver. This suggests it is important to control for differences in loan characteristics in 
my multivariate analysis. 
The last two columns of Table 5.2 present mean differences for the sample with 
TOTNW (and TANNW) versus NNW. These results document significant differences 
across three groups as the means of most variables are statistically different.33  In sum, 
when viewing columns 4-6 together, all the firm, lender, and loan characteristics shown 
here vary significantly among the three groups and thus it is important to include all these 
variables in my multivariate analysis.   
Table 5.3 presents Spearman correlations among the set of variables employed in 
my regression analyses. I find that RatingExist is correlated with Size with a coefficient 
of 0.60, which is consistent with rating agencies tending to rate larger firms. DebtTan is 
positively correlated with Lev with a correlation coefficient of 0.58, which suggests that it 
is important to control for Lev in the multivariate analysis.  Next, correlations with lender 
characteristics are presented. A positive correlation of 0.28 between IndLend and 
RelaLend suggests that the underlying constructs they capture are different although not 
completely independent. Moreover, IndLend and RelaLend are negatively correlated with  
                                                 
33 One might notice that the NNW group has a higher value of DebtTan and Relalend than both the 
TOTNW and TANNW groups. Recall that this is univariate analysis. The focus of my examination is the 
use of TOTNW relative to TANNW, and the NNW group is included in the sample to address the selection 
bias. 
  





Size BTM Lev ROA Loss DebtTan IndLend RelaLend 
Syndicat
eSize 
Yield LoanSize Maturity FINCOV GENCOV Revolver 
GW 0.35 0.08 0.11 -0.07 -0.06 0.06 -0.03 0.33 0.06 0.10 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.12 0.15 -0.03 
OthIntan  0.15 0.24 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.22 0.11 0.13 0.15 -0.05 -0.11 0.13 0.07 0.10 -0.04 
RatingExist   0.60 -0.07 0.25 -0.01 -0.10 0.35 0.24 0.31 0.39 -0.35 -0.36 0.04 -0.12 -0.05 -0.11 
Size    -0.35 -0.07 0.22 -0.29 0.20 0.27 0.33 0.49 -0.64 -0.45 0.05 -0.21 -0.13 -0.14 
BTM     0.52 -0.33 0.13 -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.10 0.20 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 
LEV      -0.50 0.15 0.58 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.10 -0.32 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 -0.09 
ROA       -0.70 -0.28 0.11 0.06 0.10 -0.31 0.16 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.04 
LOSS        0.08 -0.14 -0.11 -0.16 0.36 0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.06 0.01 
DebtTan         0.07 0.17 0.27 0.00 -0.23 0.11 -0.01 0.07 -0.14 
IndLend          0.28 0.38 -0.29 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.13 
RelaLend           0.26 -0.29 -0.11 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.01 
SyndicateSize            -0.24 -0.08 0.28 0.10 0.22 -0.14 
Yield             0.20 0.09 0.22 0.23 -0.06 
LoanSize              0.15 0.25 0.26 0.24 
Maturity               0.12 0.19 0.05 
FINCOV                0.74 0.08 
GENCOV                 0.03 






Yield. This is consistent with the argument that lenders’ industry expertise and 
relationship lending could help, to some extent, to mitigate information asymmetry 
between borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate a reduction in the premium charged by 
lenders. This provides comfort that my two proxies for lender characteristic capture 







6.1 Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Table 6.1 reports the results of a multinomial logistic regression that examines the 
determinants of TOTNW in debt contracts. As mentioned above, I employ a multinomial 
logistic model to include loans with NNW in the analysis. This is to address a potential 
sample selection issue I would otherwise have if loans without NNW were not included.  
I set the dependent variable (NWSCOV) to be TOTNW, TANNW, or NNW depending on 
the type of covenants included in the debt contracts. I present the results for the 
comparison between the TOTNW group and the TANNW group in Table 6.1, which is 
the focus of my paper.  
The positive coefficient on DebtTan provides support for Hypothesis 1 that the 
inclusion of TOTNW is positively associated with the reliance on intangible assets to 
make debt payments. The coefficient on DebtTan indicates that 1% increase in DebtTan 
is associated with an increase of 2.608 in the probability of having TOTNW, relative to 
the probability of having TANNW. 34 This result helps us to understand the prior finding 
that the magnitude of intangibles is a determinant of TOTNW. By demonstrating a situat- 
                                                 
34 This is based on the relative risk ratio, which is the ratio of probability being in one group versus another 
group. For example, the probability of having one nonbank lender in contracts with TOTNW is 0.2 and 
with TANNW is 0.01. Then the relative risk ratio of having one nonbank lender associated with contracts 




Table 6.1 Multinomial Logistic Regression Results  
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient Std. Err. Z P-value 
DebtTan + 2.608 0.76 3.31 0.001** 
IndLend + 1.273 0.12 2.66 0.004** 
RelaLend + 0.969 0.02 -1.48 0.069 
GW + 43.689 17.22 9.58 0.000** 
OthIntan + 34.328 38.01 3.19 0.001** 
ZeroIntan ? 0.965 0.21 -0.17 0.433 
DebtTan*ZeroIntan ? 1.129 0.34 0.41 0.341 
RatingExist + 1.470 1.45 0.39 0.348 
RatingInv ? 0.612 0.60 -0.50 0.309 
ACQ + 0.825 0.19 -0.82 0.206 
Size + 1.141 0.04 3.63 0.000** 
BTM ? 0.938 0.05 -1.18 0.119 
LEV ? 0.996 0.01 -0.44 0.330 
ROA ? 2.005 0.60 2.31 0.330 
LOSS ? 1.036 0.11 0.33 0.371 
Maturity + 1.100 0.05 2.16 0.015 
SyndicateSize + 1.012 0.00 3.21 0.001** 
LoanSize + 1.369 0.24 1.76 0.039* 
Yield + 0.749 0.09 -2.31 0.039* 
FINcov ? 0.562 0.05 -6.26 0.000** 
GENcov ? 1.847 0.14 8.30 0.000** 
Revolver ? 0.863 0.05 -2.60 0.005** 
Intercept ? 0.182 0.07 -4.23 0.000** 
N  30,468    
Pseudo-R-Squared  24.63%    
**,*denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05 or better. For variable definitions see Appendix A.  
Dependent variable equals to TOTNW or TANNW or NNW; Only results for TOTNW versus TANNW are 
shown below. Coefficients are in relative risk ratio. Industry controls are included. Firm-clustered standard 
errors are reported. P-value is reported for one-tailed test results. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
probability of being in contracts with TOTNW. For borrowers with one percent of DebtTan, the probability 
of having TOTNW in debt contracts is 0.2608 and having TANNW is 0.1. Then the relative risk ratio of 
one percent of DebtTan is associated with an increase of 2.608 in the probability of having contracts with 




ion where intangible assets are viewed as economically relevant, my analysis disputes the 
argument in the literature that liquidation concern is the only consideration in lenders’ 
decision to include intangible assets in debt contracts. 
Lenders’ industry expertise (IndLend) is strongly positively associated with the 
inclusion of TOTNW, consistent with Hypothesis 2. A unit increase in IndLend is 
associated with an increase of 1.273 in the probability of having TOTNW relative to 
having TANNW. This finding suggests that lenders with greater industry expertise are 
more likely to include intangible assets in debt contracts, which provides us a more 
complete picture of why intangible assets are sometimes in debt contracts. The 
statistically insignificant association between access to private information (RelaLend) 
and the inclusion of TOTNW suggests that access to private information is not an 
important factor in the decision to include intangible assets in the net-worth covenant. 
Alternatively, the lack of a result on this variable might be due to inadequate control for 
the differences between the comparison groups. I address this concern in the next section 
of my thesis, Chapter 6.2, which presents the results of my changes analysis. 
The positive coefficients on GW and OthIntan are consistent with prior research 
findings that the magnitude of GW and OthIntan are associated with the choice of 
TANNW versus TOTNW. Further, the coefficients on the additional control variables 
included in my model are consistent with prior research (Frankel et al., 2008; Beatty et 
al., 2008), as I find positive coefficients on SyndicateSize, LoanSize, Yield, and Size.  
Overall, the results in Table 6.1 indicate that TOTNW is more likely to be used 




debt payments (DebtTan) and when lenders have more industry expertise (IndLend). 
These results hold even after controlling for the association between TOTNW and the 
amount of intangible assets that has been documented in prior research. In so doing, these 
results further our understanding of how intangible assets get used in debt contracts. 
Further, my results demonstrate that in some circumstances, lack of value upon 
liquidation is not lenders’ primary concern as suggested by prior studies (e.g., Watts 
2006).  
 
6.2 Analysis on the Subsample that Firms Switch between  
Net-worth Covenants 
 
I perform a change analysis using a subsample of firms that switch between the 
two types of net-worth covenants. That is, firms change from having TANNW covenants 
to TOTNW covenants, and vice versa. This analysis is intended to address the concern 
that the associations documented in the levels analysis are potentially driven by 
inadequate controls for time-unvarying unobservable factors, such as the differences 
between the comparison groups. Furthermore, the changes analysis helps to establish a 
causal relationship between my hypothesized determinants and covenant choice.  
I calculate the change in firm characteristics variables (ΔVariables) as the 
difference between the variable measured before the firm’s first contract with a TOTNW 
(TANNW) covenant and the variable measured before a subsequent contract with a 
TANNW (TOTNW) for the same firm. I measure the differences in lender and loan 




first contract with a TOTNW (TANNW) covenant and the time of the firm’s subsequent 
contract with a TANNW (TOTNW) covenant. 
In Table 6.2, I present the mean and median values of the differences for each of 
the hypothesized determinants (i.e., DebtTan, IndLend, and RelaLend). Table 6.2 Panel A 
examines the case in which firms switch from TOTNW to TANNW. DebtTan is 
significantly smaller prior to entering a contract with TOTNW as opposed to later 
entering a contract with TANNW. This suggests that a decrease in lenders’ need to rely 
on the cash flows associated with intangible assets to make debt payments (DebtTan) is 
associated with a switch to a contract that excludes intangible assets in net-worth coven 
ants. This finding is consistent with my Hypothesis 1. 
 
Table 6.2 Mean and Median Analysis for the Subsample that Switch between TOTNW 
and TANNW 
 
Panel A: Switch from TOTNW into TANNW 
N=331 ΔDebtTan ΔIndLend ΔRelaLend 
Mean  -0.027** -0.127** -0.728** 
Median -0.012 0.000 -0.500 
     
Panel B: Switch from TANNW into TOTNW 
N=553 ΔDebtTan ΔIndLend ΔRelaLend 
Mean  0.073** 0.096** 0.323** 
Median 0.030 0.000 0.333 
     
**,*denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05 or better. The underline “_”denotes significance at the 0.01or 





In addition, the mean values of IndLend and RelaLend are also smaller while the 
median value of IndLend is not. This suggests that lenders on the earlier loan with 
TOTNW are stronger in terms of and access to private information (RelaLend) than 
lenders who are party to the later loans with TANNW. This analysis provides support for 
Hypothesis 3 but not much for Hypothesis 2.  
Table 6.2 Panel B examines the case in which firms switch from TANNW to 
TOTNW. In contrast to the results in Panel A, DebtTan and RelaLend increase 
significantly.35 These results provide additional support for the first and third of my 
hypotheses.  
In additional to the multivariate analysis documented in Table 6.2, I conduct a 
multivariate analysis and present the results in Table 6.3. I set the dependent variable 
equal to one when a firm switches from TANNW to TOTNW, and zero when it switches 
from TOTNW to TANNW. If DebtTan is positively associated with the use of TOTNW, 
I expect the change in DebtTan (ΔDebtTan) to be positively associated with changing 
from TANNW to TOTNW, and Similarly for ΔIndLend and ΔRelaLend.  
As shown in Model 1, ΔDebtTan, ΔIndLend, and ΔRelaLend are positively 
associated with the change from TANNW to TOTNW. These results confirm the results 
of my levels analysis that the reliance on intangible assets to make debt payments 
(DebtTan) and lenders’ industry expertise (IndLend) are important factors in determining 
the use of intangible assets in net-worth covenants. Furthermore, the coefficient on Rela- 
                                                 
35 The average period between the switch from TOTNW to TANNW is 3.82 years and the average period 




Table 6.3 Logistic Regression for the Subsample that Switch between TOTNW and 
TANNW  
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variables Coefficient Std. Err. P  Coefficient Std. Err. P 
ΔDebtTan 2.133 0.53 0.000**  2.427 0.59 0.000** 
ΔIndLend 0.722 0.19 0.000**  0.567 0.20 0.005** 
ΔRelaLend 0.132 0.04 0.000**  0.168 0.04 0.000** 
ΔGW 10.621 1.71 0.000**  10.36 1.74 0.000** 
ΔOthIntan 12.499 3.25 0.000**  11.45 3.75 0.000** 
ΔMaturity 0.119 0.11 0.129  0.177 .011 0.117 
ΔSyndicateSize 0.014 0.01 0.015*  0.009 0.01 0.146 
ΔFINcov -0.320 0.19 0.045*  -0.370 0.19 0.063 
ΔGENcov 1.204 0.17 0.000**  1.071 0.18 0.000** 
ΔRevolver 0.142 0.17 0.198  0.120 0.17 0.491 
ΔYield 0.241 0.25 0.171  0.502 0.26 0.057 
ΔLoanSize -0.525 0.14 0.000**  -0.360 0.15 0.016* 
ΔBTM 0.390 0.14 0.003**  0.999 0.19 0.000** 
ΔROA 0.215 0.99 0.413  -2.54 1.07 0.018* 
ΔSizeR     0.74 0.11 0.000** 
Intercept 0.324 0.086 0.0001**  0.259 0.09 0.000** 
N  884    884  
Pseudo-R-
Squared 
 26.13%    31.32%  
**,*denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05 or better. For variable definitions see Appendix A.  
Dependent variable: from TOTNW into TANNW: 0; from TANNW into TOTNW: 1. P-value is reported 






Lend is also significantly positive in change analysis. This finding suggests that the lack 
of results in the levels analysis is due to insufficient power, and provides support for my 
third hypothesis that access to private information promotes the use of intangible assets in 
net-worth covenants.  
In Model 2, I add the change in equity market size-decile (ΔSizeR). Market size is 
commonly viewed as an important dimension of firm information environment 
(Wiedman, 1996). I control for ΔSizeR because one possible explanation for the result of 
ΔIndLend and ΔRelaLend is that as a firm grows bigger, there is more information out 
there about the firm and thus, lenders feel more comfortable to include intangible assets 
in net-worth covenants rather. This suggests that the inclusion of intangible assets can be 
due to better information available to lenders about intangible assets rather than better 
industry knowledge and access to private information for lenders. ΔDebtTan, ΔIndLend, 
and ΔRelaLend remain significantly positive, which provides additional support for all of 
my three hypotheses. 
Taken together, the results of my levels and changes analysis provide support for 
my predictions that DebtTan, IndLend, and RelaLend are determinants for the choice of 
including intangible assets in net-worth covenants. These three factors contribute to our 








This paper examines the association between three borrower and lender 
characteristics and the decision to include intangible assets in net-worth covenants. 
Future research could examine how recent accounting standards for intangible assets, 
such SFAS 141 and 142, affect the relation between these three factors and the use of 
TOTNW. Frankel et al. (2008) find some evidence suggesting that the use of TOTNW is 
reduced following the adoption of SFAS 141 and 142. Since Frankel et al. (2008) do not 
investigate why the magnitude of intangible assets are associated with the inclusion of 
intangible assets in net-worth covenants, their study does not address how or why SFAS 
141 and 142 affect the use of intangible assets in net-worth covenant. An examination of 
the impact of SFAS 141 and 142 on the three borrower and lender characteristics will 
help us to understand how accounting standards affect the use of an accounting item in 
debt covenants. For example, I expect debt contracts require a borrower to have higher 
reliance on intangible assets to include TOTNW following SFAS 141 and 142, if SFAS 
141 and 142 on average lead to less informative reported numbers of intangible assets.  
I could also investigate the impact of the deliberation process and adoption of 
SFAS 141 and 142 on debt covenants. Prior research focuses on how managers react to 
the adopted accounting standards when they are facing the effect of the new standards 




debt contracts initiated during this process and how the deliberation process and 
ultimate adoption of accounting standards differentially affect debt contracts. SFAS 141 
and 142 provide an interesting setting to examine these issues because the original 
exposure drafts differ significantly from the adopted standards and SFAS 141 and 142 
took place over a fairly short window. This mitigates the concern that other changes in 
the credit market might explain observed associations.  
Ramanna (2008) finds that 21 industry associations lobbied FASB in the 
deliberation process of SFAS 141 and 142. This implies that firms in these industries 
anticipated being disproportionally affected by SFAS 141 and 142. Focusing on firms in 
these industries, I plan to examine how debt contracts change for these industries 
through the different stages in the deliberation process, as well as following adoption of 
SFAS 141 and 142. This examination will help us to understand how the deliberation 
process of accounting regulation (and the resulting uncertainty) impact debt contracts 
and what different effects the deliberation process and the adoption of accounting 






Intangible assets are an important and significant asset on corporate balance sheet. 
The use of intangible assets in debt contracting, however, is questioned by prior research 
(Holthausen and Watts, 2001;Watts, 2006). This is because intangible assets can have no 
liquidation value, associate with future cash flow with high uncertainty, and are reported 
based on highly subjective estimates.  
While prior researchers are skeptical about the role of intangible assets in debt 
contracts, recent studies document the inclusion of intangible assets in TOTNW and use 
as collateral (Frankel et al., 2008; Loumioti, 2012). In particular, Frankel et al. find that 
the inclusion of intangible assets in net-worth covenant, one the most frequently used 
financial covenant, is a function of the magnitude of intangible assets. Given the 
arguments by prior research, such a relation is not expected. Thus, this result triggers 
the question of why and what we miss in prior research. In this dissertation, I attempt to 
answer these questions, by examining three potential determinants of the use of 
TOTNW.  
The theoretical model by Aghion and Bolton (1992) suggests that debt 
covenants are likely to be based on accounting numbers that correlate with the states of 
world. In the context of net-worth covenants, I argue that intangible assets would be 




debt payments, these assets are a more sensitive signal of the states of the world, and 
when lenders have industry expertise and access to private information, these assets are 
less noisy signal of the states of the world.  
I at first conduct a levels analysis and find that the use of TOTNW is more likely 
when firms have higher debt-to-tangible assets ratio and when lenders have industry 
expertise. These findings are consistent with my predictions that intangible assets are 
relevant to debt covenants when the reliance on intangible assets to make debt payments 
is higher, and when lenders have industry expertise. The insignificant result on lenders’ 
access to private information might suggest this factor is not an important determinant 
in the decision of including intangible assets in net-worth covenants. Alternatively, this 
potentially can be contributed to insufficient controls in this cross-sectional test. 
I then do a changes analysis to mitigate this insufficient control concern, and 
furthermore to give causal implications to my findings. I find results consistent with my 
three predictions that the use of TOTNW is a function of the reliance on intangible 
assets to make debt payments is higher, lenders industry expertise, and access to private 
information. Furthermore, I find that all three factors remain significant when 
controlling for the change in firm equity market size-decile, which captures the change 
in firm information environment.  
Overall, my findings provide new evidence on the determinants of the use of 
TOTNW, which helps us to understand why the prior finding that the relation between 
the magnitude of intangible assets and the use of TOTNW exists and thus contributes to 




the literation on implication of lenders characteristics on debt contracts by identifying 
two lender characteristics that affect inclusion of intangible assets in net-worth 
covenants. Furthermore, I find that the effect of lenders characteristics on debt contracts 
is robust to the borrowing firms’ information environment.  
Future research might extend to examine the effects of recent accounting 
standards on intangible assets. I can investigate how these accounting standards interact 
with the three determinants in this study to affect the inclusion of intangible assets in 
net-worth covenants. Another angle of investigating the effect of accounting standards 
is to examine how the deliberation process affects the design of debt contracts and how 
the effects of the deliberation process is different from the adoption of standards. The 
accounting standards related to intangible assets, SFAS 141 and 142, provide a unique 
setting to examine these research questions. Building on the three factors examined in 
this study, I can focus on how the deliberation process and the adoption affect the 







Variable Name Variable Description 
NWSCOV Equal to 3 for Total-asset net-worth covenant, 2 for Tangible net-worth 
covenant and 1 for no net-worth covenants. 
IndLend 
The number of participant lenders who have lent to the same industry as the 
current borrower in the preceding five years, as of the total number of 
participant lenders.  
RelaLend 
The average of the time length (i.e., in years) that lead lenders have been the 
lead arranger for the current borrower. I identify the lead arrangers following 
Bharath et al 2007. That is, a bank is not described as “participant” is treated 
as a lead bank. 
DebtTan 
The ratio of total liability divided by tangible assets. 
GW 
The amount of goodwill scaled by total assets. 
OthIntan 
The amount of other intangible assets scaled by total assets. 
ZeroIntan An indicator variable equal to one when the firm has zero intangible assets, 
zero otherwise. 
Yield The log of the mark up (in basis points) over LIBOR (i.e., London Interbank 
Offered Rate). 
  
Variable Name Variable Description 
LoanSize 
The amount of loan divided by total assets. 
Maturity 
The log of loan maturity (in months). 
FINcov The log of the number of financial covenants. 
 
GENcov The log of the number of nonfinancial covenants. 
 
RatingExist An indicator variable equal to one if the S&P issuer long-term rating exist for 
the firm, and zero if the rating is missing. 
RatingInv 
An indicator variable equal to one if the S&P issuer long-term rating is 
investment grade or above and zero otherwise. I set the variable to zero when 
the rating is missing. 
Size 
The log of equity market value. Equity market value is in millions. 
BM 
Book value of equity divided by market value of equity. 
LEV 
Total liabilities divided by market value of equity. 
ROA 
Net income divided by total assets. 
LOSS An indicator variable equal to one if net income is negative and zero 
otherwise.  
ACQ 
The acquisition made in the firm’s 2-digit SIC code scaled by the total market 
value of all firms in the same industry group, in the year before the debt 
contract, following Frankel et al. (2008). 
ΔVariable 
The differences between the variable measured right before a firm at first has 
a contract with a total-asset NW and measured right before switching to a 




Variable Name Variable Description 
ΔSizeR 
The difference between the equity market size decile that a firm is in when it 
at first has a contract with a total-asset NW and when it later switch to a 
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